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JURISDICTION
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Section
78A-4-103(2)(h), UTAH CODE ANN. (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.

Is it proper for a court to retroactively modify an order for spousal support

under Utah Code section 78-45-9.3(4) to the date of notice of the petition to
modify if that notice did not provide notice of the section 30-3-5(10) cohabitation
claim on which the court based its determination?
1.

Standard of Review

The Court of Appeals will review a trial court's statutory interpretation
under a correction of error standard. Brinkerhoffv. Brinkerhoff 945 P.2d 113, 115
(Utah App. 1997); Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah App. 1996).
Appellant preserved the issue for appeal by objecting to the Motion to
Amend Petition (R.346-350) as well as moving to strike the Amended Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce, which added a cohabitation claim to the Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce. (R. 356-357.) The Motion to Strike was denied by the
trial court. (R. 533.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this case.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-3-5(3), (10) (West 2004), in relevant part:

l

Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children —
Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parenttime -- Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new
orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.

(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
cohabitating with another person.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-9.3(4) (West 2004) (now renumbered and

amended as 78B-12-112 (2008)) provides in relevant part:
(4) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but
only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the
petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
RULES PROVISION
There are no Rules Provision.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Based on a modification of the statute limiting alimony to a period of time
not longer than the length of the marriage, the Respondent sought termination of
the alimony award. Four years later, Respondent, over Petitioner's objection, was
allowed to amend his Petition for Modification to include a claim of cohabitation
for termination of the alimony award. The Trial Court was only presented
evidence of the cohabitation issue at trial and ruled for Respondent and terminated
the alimony award but in doing this, terminated the alimony back to the date of the
service of the original Petition for Modification. It is the legal issue as to when the
alimony termination date should have been made which is the basis of this appeal.
RELEVANT FACTS
Jon Black (Respondent) and Kim Black (Petitioner) were divorced on July
3, 1989. (R. 31). On June 7, 2001, Jon Black served on Kim Black a Petition for
Modification for the termination of the alimony based on a change in the statute
which limited alimony to a period of time to be no greater than the length of the
parties' marriage. (R. 76-80). Four years later, in June 2005, Jon Black filed an
Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, claiming cohabitation by Kim
Black (R. 328-338), which Amended Petition was opposed (R. 346-350) and
requested to be stricken (R. 356-357), which was denied by the trial court (R. 358
-360 & 533). After trial in this matter, the court determined that Kim Black had in
fact cohabitated and terminated the alimony. (R. 748) The court held that the
alimony order should be modified retroactively, and used the date of the original
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service of the Petition for Modification, June 2001, rather than either the date of
the Amended Petition, June 2005 (when the cohabitation claim was added), (R.
748), or the date of establishing the cohabitation, which would have been the date
of the order terminating alimony, November 30, 2007 (R. 749).
The original petition had been certified as ready for trial on April 1, 2003
(R. 232-233), but after the pretrial conference, respondent did nothing until
February 15, 2005 to move the case along (R. 250-251). A bench trial was
scheduled (R. 257-258) which was thereafter continued by respondent. It was
after this scheduled trial that Jon Black filed his amended petition. Respondent
certified the matter as ready for trial September 22, 2006 (R. 542-544) but
thereafter again continued the case. Respondent again certified the case ready for
trial August 3, 2007 (R. 703-705) with the case finally being tried November 2627, 2007.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Based on the language of Utah Code section 30-3-5(10), it would be
inappropriate to retroactively modify an alimony order based on cohabitation.
That section provides, "[a]ny order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the
former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Id. To retroactively modify
an order for spousal support after it has been terminated by cohabitation, as
occurred in this case, is not reasonable. Furthermore, the legislature surely could
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not have intended the harsh results that would occur should alimony be altogether
terminated retroactively.
Even if it is consistent with Utah Code section 30-3-5(10) to retroactively
modify alimony orders based on cohabitation, such relation back should not
extend further than when notice of the cohabitation claim was received by the
alimony recipient. Attempting to amend a petition to modify a divorce decree by
adding a cohabitation claim, as Respondent did here, is an end run around the
plain language of 30-3-5(10), which provides for termination of the alimony upon
establishment of cohabitation, and not modification of the alimony order.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-5(10)
DOES NOT ALLOW FOR RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION OF
ALIMONY AWARDS BASED ON COHABITATION.
A. An Alimony Order Terminates upon the Establishment of
Cohabitation.
Utah Code section 30-3-5(10) provides, u[a]ny order of the court that a
party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 30-3-5(10) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Therefore, until the

party paying alimony establishes that the former spouse is cohabitating, the order
to pay alimony continues in force. Termination of alimony is triggered not by
cohabitation, but by the establishment of cohabitation.

5

Section 30-3-5(10) provides that the alimony oidei "terminates" upon
establishment of cohabitation The court below held that John Black "met the
burden to establish [Kim Black's] co-habitation and therefoie alimony is
teiminated " (R 748) Aftei the judge oidered the alimony to be terminated, he
then ordered the ahmony to be retioactively modified to June of 2001, when the
petition to modify was filed (R 748) Utah Code section 30-3-5(10) cleaily
piovides that the alimony oidei "teiminates upon establishment" of cohabitation,
and not that a couit has discretion to modify an alimony oider upon establishment
of cohabitation (emphasis added) Although courts are given bioad discretion in
awarding alimony and in modifying such orders, Diener v Diener, 2004 UT App
314, T| 4, 98 P 3d 1178, see also UTAH CODE ANN § 30-3-5(3), the court should
not have discietion to modify orders where the statute clearly provides for
termination upon establishment of cohabitation The alimony should have been
terminated Novembei 30, 2007 which is the date of establishment of cohabitation
B. Utah Code section 78-45-9.3(4), which authorizes retroactive
modification of child support and alimony orders, does not apply to alimony
orders that have been terminated by establishing cohabitation under section
30-3-5(10).
At the time of the ruling of the lowei couit, Utah Code section 78-45-9 3(4)
(West 2004) (now lenumbeied and amended at 78B-12-112 (2008)) was in effect,
authorizing retroactive modification of child support and alimony orders "[a]
child oi spousal suppoit payment under a child support order may be modified
with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only from
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the date of service of the pleading on the obligee . . . ." It is unlikely that the
legislature intended this section to apply to alimony orders that had already been
terminated pursuant to section 30-3-5(10), as terminated orders cannot be
modified.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the legislature intended the harsh
consequences that would prevail if 78-45-9.3(4) applied to cohabitants whose
alimony had been terminated under 30-3-5(10). According to Utah Code section
78-45-9.3(4), "[o]nce the tribunal determines that a modification is appropriate,
the tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered for any difference in the original
order and the modified amount for the period from the service of the pleading until
the final order of modification is entered." Because the "modified amount" will
always be zero if cohabitation is established, retroactive modification of alimony
orders would create a significant financial hardship on alimony recipients, as
recipients would have to reimburse the obligor for all payments since the date of
the service of the modification pleading. The financial hardship is especially
salient in cases where, as here, considerable time has passed since the date of the
service of the modification pleading.1 It is more likely that the legislature
intended that alimony payments simply be terminated upon establishment of
cohabitation, as section 30-3-5(10) provides, than that alimony recipients be liable
for a large lump-sum payment of claims of when cohabitation allegedly
1

Almost six and one-half years have passed between the date that notice of the
modification pleading was given and the court's retroactive modification order.
(R. 748).
7

commenced. The respondent is the party who continually continued the matter
and it should not be to petitioner's determent the financial hardship that would
occur to her under the court's ruling and the respondent's lack of moving the case
forward.
Utah Code section 78-45-9.3(4) should not be interpreted broadly, to
include the termination of alimony orders based on cohabitation under section 303-5(10). In Wall v. Wall, the court stated that it is "clear that as a general rule . . .
support orders are cnot subject to retroactive modification.'" 2007 UT App 61, ^f
20, 157 P.3d 341, (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9.3(3)(c)).
II.
EVEN IE RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION OE ALIMOJN Y
AWARDS TERMINATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 30-3-5(10) IS
PROPER, THE MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT RELATE BACK TO A
DATE PREVIOUS TO THE RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF THE
COHABITATION CLAIM BY THE ALLEGED COHABITANT.
In June of 2001, Jon Black filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce
(R. 76-80). That petition was based on the allegation that a "substantial and
material change in circumstances" had occurred (R. 77). In June 2005, Jon Black
filed an Amended Petition of Modification, claiming cohabitation by Kim Black
(R. 328-338), which Amended Petition was opposed and icquested to be stricken,
which was denied by the trial court (R. 358-360 & 533). After trial in this matter,
the court determined that Kim Black had in fact cohabitated and terminated the
alimony (R. 748). The court held that the alimony should be modified
retroactively, and used the date of the original service of the Petition for
Modification, June 2001, rather than either the date of the Amended Petition, June
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2005 (when the cohabitation claim was added), (R. 748), or the date of
establishing the cohabitation, which would have been the date of the order
terminating alimony, November 30, 2007 (R. 749).
In Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, t 19-20, 35 P.3d 341, the court held
that Utah Code section 78-45-9.3(4) gave the court discretion to modify a spousal
support payment under a child support order retroactively. The court in Wilde also
noted that courts have broad discretion to retroactively modify alimony awards:
"[t]he only substantive limitation on that discretion was that the modification
could run only from the date of notice of the petition." Id. (citing Ball v. Peterson,
912 P.2d 1006, 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818,
820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
A. It was Inappropriate for Respondent to add a Cohabitation Claim to the
Existing Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce
A petition to modify spousal support under Utah Code section 78-45-9.3(4)
and a petition to terminate alimony under section 30-3-5(10) are distinct and
separate statutes with different requires and purposes, and it is inappropriate to add
a petition to terminate alimony to an existing petition to modify spousal support.
First, to show that a modification of spousal support is in order, the claimant must
prove entirely different facts from those required to prove cohabitation. To prevail
on a petition to modify an order of spousal support, the claimant must meet the
threshold requirement of proving that there has been a "substantial change in
circumstances" which was not contemplated by the divorce decree. Wall, 2007
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UT App 61,^11 To pievail on a petition to teiminate alimony based on Utah
Code section 30-3-5(10), the claimant must prove the elements of cohabitation
(1) common lesidency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association "
Gaicia v Gaicia, 2002 UT App 381, ^f 5, 60 P 3d 1174 (quoting Pendleton v
Pendleton, 918 P 2d 159, 160 n 1) Second, and more importantly, the remedies
are distinct under the two claims If the court determines there has been a
substantial change in circumstances, the court may modify the divorce decree
under Utah Code section 30-3-5(3) If the couit determines that the alimony
recipient has been cohabitating with anothei, alimony is terminated 30-3-5(10)
In adding the June 2005 claim (cohabitation terminates alimony) to the
June 2001 Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, Respondent attempts to make an
end run around the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) which requires
termination, and not modification Significantly, although there is a statute, (§ 7845-9 3(4)), and case law that supports retroactive modification of alimony awards,
Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, ^f 19-20, Respondent, m his motion to the lower court,
had not cited any prior law that piovides for the retroactive termination or
modification of alimony awards based on cohabitation Respondent's attempt to
piggyback his claim to terminate based on cohabitation on top of a petition to
modify a spousal support order is clearly for the purpose of retroactively
terminating alimony, and the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) does not permit
that result
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B. Retroactively Modifying the Alimony Order Back to the Date of the 2001
Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree Undercuts the Rationale for Requiring
that a Modification Can Only Relate Back to the Date that Service of the
Pleading was Given to the Obligee.
Former Utah Code section 78-45-9.3(4) (West 2004) (now renumbered and
amended at 78B-12-112 (2008)) provided, u[a] child or spousal support payment
under a child support order may be modified with respect to any period during
which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading
on the obligee . . . ." The rationale for the limit on retroactive modification to the
date the obligee receives notice is apparently to let the obligee know that the order
may be modified, and that some portion of the money may have to be returned.
Jon Black's 2001 Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce gave notice to Kim
Black that alimony payments might be modified, based on the claims in that
Petition. (R. 76-80.) In June of 2005., when the cohabitation claim was added, Kim
Black was on notice that alimony payments could be terminated "upon
establishment" of cohabitation. § 30-5-10(3). The 2001 notice of the petition to
modify the divorce decree did not provide adequate notice of the 2005 claim that
alimony should be terminated based on cohabitation. Therefore, if retroactive
modification based on cohabitation is allowed, it should relate back to the time
that notice of the cohabitation claim was given, and should not relate back to the
2001 petition. It is important to note that the court's decision to retroactively
modify alimony was based exclusively on the 2005 cohabitation claim, and the
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court did not cite any of the allegations in the 2001 petition as bases for its
decision (R. 748).
CONCLUSION
The plain language of Utah Code Section 30-3-5(10) provides for the termination
of alimony upon the establishment of cohabitation, and does not allow for
modification, retroactive or otherwise. Petitioner asks this court to hold that the
termination of alimony should commence upon establishment of cohabitation,
November 30, 2007, which was the date of the order terminating alimony, and
should not be applied retroactively (R. 748-749). If this Court holds that
retroactive modification based on cohabitation is consistent with section 30-35(10), retroactive modification should relate back to June 2005, when the
cohabitation claim was made, and should not relate back to June 2001, when the
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce was made.
Dated this

day of March, 2008.

JR
RANDY S. LUDLOW
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

day of March, 2008,1 caused to be

mailed, by deposit in the United Stales Mail, two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:
A ttorn eys for Appellee/Respon den t:
One (1) copy to:
Scott W. Hansen, #1347
Lewis Hansen Waldo & Pleshe, LLC
Eight East Broadway, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
One (1) cop to:
Asa E. Kelley, # 7905
The Law Office of Asa E. Kelley, LLC
859 East 900 South, Ste 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

/s/
SHARLA J. WEAVER
Legal Assistant
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EXHIBIT A

FILED Bimm
Asa E. Kelley (7905)
KELLEY & KELLEY, LLC
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone:. (801) 531-6686
Facsimile: (801)531-6690

COURT

Third Judicial District *

m
,

c

•y-f1^

0 4 200!

SALT LAKE COUNTY

,„„_

Ojputy Clerk

Attorney for Defendant
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KIMS.BLAI

Is,

Plaintiff,
vs.
JON C. BLACK,
Defendant.

;)

)
;
)
]
jI
i
]

VERIFIED PETITION TO
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE
Case No. 894900342DA
Judge:
Leon A. Dever
Comm'r: T. Patrick Casey

COMES NOW, Jon C. Black, Defendant, by and through counsel, and hereby requests and
moves this Court to modify the Decree of Divorce previously entered in this matter. In support thereof,
Defendant alleges as follows:
1

That Jon Cornell Black is the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, and is a resident of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant, prior to the parties' entry of Decree of Divorce and continuing to date,

suffered and suffers from paranoid schizophrenia.
3.

That Kim . Black is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter, and is a resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.

4.

The parties were married on June 7, 1980, in Summit County, Utah.

5.

The Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced from one another by Decree of Divorce made

and entered by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about
July 3, 1989.
6.

The parties marriage, therefore, existed for approximately nine years, one month.

7.

Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce, Defendant was ordered to pay alimony

in the amount of $750.00 per month for an indeterminate period of time.
8.

Since the entry of Decree of Divorce, the following substanlial and material change in

circumstances has occurred, which were not contemplated at the time of the parties' divorce, which in
turn warrants a modification of the Decree of Divorce;
a.

Defendant's income (supplemented entirely by government assistance due to his

schizophrenia) has remained relatively static since the divorce—only increasing approximately
$41.00 per year since the entry of Decree of Divorce.
b.

Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs income has increased appreciably since

the entry of Decree of Divorce.
c.

The parties' only child, in which Plaintiff obtained physical custody at the time of

the entry of Decree of Divorce, has reached the age of majority and is able to provide for his own
care and support.
d.

Although the parties' marriage lasted nine years, one month, Defendant has been

making alimony payments for approximately twelve years—35 months longer than the marriage
existed and totaling additional alimony payments of $24,750.00.

9.

Based on the forgoing, it is reasonable, necessary, and proper that the Decree of

Divorce be modified and the Defendant's alimony obligation be terminated.
ivJ.

It is fair and reasonable that each party should be ordered to pay his or her own

attorney's fees and costs incurred in bringing this action if this matter is uncontested. However, should
Plaintiff contest this action, it is fair aiid reasonable that th

* ordered to pay Defendant's

attorneys fees and cost incurred herein.
All other terms and provisions set for in the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered shall
remain in full force and effect to the extent not inconsistent with the terms and provisions set forth
herein.
IEREFORE, Defendant prays for the following relief:
1.

For an order of modification as outlined above.

2.

For an order of attorney fees and cost incurred herein if this matter is contested.

3.

For such other an

^v her relief as the court may see j ust and proper.

DATED this_4^ day of June. 2001.

KELLEY & KELLEY, LLC

Asa E. Kelley
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Defendant

This VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE is filed on behalf of:
Jon C. Black
130 South 500 East, #308
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

VERIFICATION
Jon Black, being first duly sworn deposes and states: he has read the foregoing Verified Petition
to Modify Decree of Divorce and understands its contents, and acknowledges and affirms that the
information and facts contained in the document are true and correct to she own personal knowledge or
belief where indicated, and that he is signing the document voluntarily for its stated purpose.
DATED this ^

day of _

70~

•4,

2001.

O&yiJon Black

<^ >

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this L^

day of ^)lJMs

SARA MARCHANT

NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF UTAH
384 Capitol Park Avenu*
Salt lata City, UT 84103
HyConW-Eip. 4-3-2005

ZTJlAnfa,

RY PUBLIC

2001.

EXHIBIT B

Scott W. Hansen (1347)
BUCKLAND ORTON, LLC
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 801
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)531-6686
Facsimile: (801)531-6690
Asa E. Kelley (7905)
KELLEY & KELLEY, LLC

859 East 900 South, Ste 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801)746-3315
Facsimile: (801) 359-3956
Attorneys for Respondent

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
KIM S. BLACK,

]1
|
]

AMENDED PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.

]I

Case No.

894900342

JON C. BLACK,

>

Judge:

L. A. Dever

i

Commissioner:

T. Patrick Casey

Petitioner,

Respondent.

Respondent, Jon C. Black, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and by and
through counsel, hereby submits his Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. Respondent
requests and moves this Court to modify the Decree of Divorce previously entered in this matter. In
support thereof, Respondent alleges as follows:

FIRST CAUSE FOR MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY
LENGTH OF THE MARRIAGE
1.

Jon Cornell Black is the Respondent in the above-entitled matter, and is a resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Respondent, prior to the parties' entry of Decree of Divorce and continuing, to date,

suffered and suffers from paranoid schizophrenia.
3.

Kim S. Black is the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter, and is a resident of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.
4.

The parties were married on June 7, 1980, in Summit County, Utah.

5.

The Petitioner and Respondent were divorced from one another by Decree of Divorce

made and entered by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or
about July 3, 1989.
6.

The parties' marriage, therefore, existed for approximately nine years, one month.

7.

Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce, Respondent was ordered to pay

alimony in the amount of $750.00 per month for an indeterminate period of time.
8.

Since the entry of Decree of Divorce, the following substantial and material change in

circumstances has occurred, which were not contemplated at the time of the parties' divorce, which in
turn warrants a modification of the Decree of Divorce:
a.

Respondent's income (consisting entirely by government assistance due to his

paranoid-schizophrenia) has remained relatively static since the divorce-only increasing
approximately $41.00 per year since the entry of Decree of Divorce;
2

b.

Upon information and belief, Petitioner's income has increased appreciably since

the entry of Decree of Divorce;
c.

The parties' only child, Jacob Black, of whom Petitioner obtained physical

custody at the time of the entry of Decree of Divorce, has reached the age of majority and is able
to provide for his own care and support;
d.

Although the parties' marriage lasted nine years, one month, Respondent has been

making alimony payments for approximately sixteen years, which yields the following facts:
i.

Respondent has been paying alimony approximately 82 months longer

than the marriage existed (Decree of Divorce, July 3, 1989 + 9 years and 1 month = July
30, 1998; Duration between July 30, 1998 and June 13, 2005 = 6 years, 10 months, and
15 days or ~ 82 months);
ii.

Respondent has paid $61,875.00 in alimony (82.5 months *

$750.00/month) for the 82 months running past the length of the marriage.
9.

As indicated above, Respondent's monthly income is relatively fixed. Respondent's

monthly income minus his alimony payment to Petitioner leaves him just enough money to subsist at an
assisted living facility. The amount of money Respondent contributes to alimony could be used to
provide a modicum of additional comfort.
10.

Based on the forgoing, it is reasonable, necessary, and proper that the Decree of Divorce

be modified and the Respondent's alimony obligation be terminated.
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SECOND CAUSE FOR MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY
COHABITATION BY PETITIONER IN A SEXUAL AND/OR ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP
11.

Respondent incorporates, by this reference, the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1

through 10 of this Petition.
12.

Respondent alleges that a material and substantial change in circumstance has occurred,

in that Petitioner has entered into and continues a sexual and/or romantic relationship with a man by the
name of Teddy Tomlin.
13.

Mr. Tomlin moved in and cohabited more or less continuously with Petitioner, but for a

few periods of time where Mr. Tomlin lived out of the state of Utah, he resided full-time or nearly fulltime with Petitioner beginning approximately October 2000.
14.

Mr. Tomlin slept in the same bed with Petitioner and, had sexual relations with

Petitioner.
15.

Mr. Tomlin recently commented to his family and Petitioner's family that he was not

receiving enough of, or the type of, sexual relations that he would like with Petitioner.
16.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin took trips with one another.

17.

Mr. Tomlin proposed marriage to Petitioner and, purportedly, bought a ring to evidence

their engagement.
18.

When Mr. Tomlin briefly took employment in Colorado, he and Petitioner contemplated

moving there together.
19.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin frequently attend family parties together.

20.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin are referred to as "Grandma Kim" and "Grandpa" by Mr.

Tomlin's step-grandchildren.
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21.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomhn have family photographs frequently taken with one anothei

and with family.
22.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin refer to each other with terms of endearment.

23.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin continued to cohabit with one another until Petitioner was

informed by Respondent's counsel that he knew of Petitioner's relationship with Mr. Tomlin. Mr.
Tomlin, abruptly moved out of Petitioner's residence on or about May 10, 2005, at the direction of
Petitioner. Petitioner and Petitioner's son and daughter-in-law moved Mr. Tomlin to the home of a
friend where he had lived prior to the time when he moved in with Petitioner and where Mr. Tomlin's
step-daughter once lived.
24.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin were aware that, if their relationship was discovered, that the

spousal support payments from Respondent to Petitioner would cease.
25.

Upon information and belief, Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin discussed with family and

friends, that Respondent's spousal support payments would cease if it was discovered that Petitioner and
Mr. Tomlin were residing together.
26.

Through deposition testimony, Respondent alleges that Petitioner contacted a number of

the deponents before deposition for the purpose of convincing them not to reveal the residence and
relationship status between Petitioner's and Mr. Tomlin's.
27.

Respondent alleges that for large portions of time, Mr. Tomlin was unemployed while

residing with Petitioner, and that Mr. Tomlin relied upon Petitioner for financial support.
28.

Respondent alleges that, to a large extent, Petitioner's ability to financially support Mr.

Tomlin and his family members can be traced to Respondent's ongoing spousal support during the time
frame in which Respondent was paying spousal support.
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29.

Respondent alleges that while Mr. Tomlin cohabited with Petitioner, the following events

occurred:
a.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin engaged in frequent sexual relations over the four year
duration of their relationship;

b.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin acted as husband and wife;

c.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin interacted extensively with each other's families,
attended family parties, appeared in family portraits, etc.;

d.

Petitioner purchased a vehicle for Mr. Tomlin;

e.

Mr. Tomlin stored most of his personal belongings in Petitioner's residence;

f.

Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin would outwardly show affection for one another, and
referred to each other with terms of endearment;

g.

Petitioner helped Mr. Tomlin's family members purchase vehicles by acting as a
co-signer or principal borrower;

h.
30.

Petitioner lent money to Mr. Tomlin's family members.

Respondent alleges that he propounded discovery (through interrogatories) regarding any

individuals residing with Petitioner. (Interrogatory 2.) Petitioner's response on this issue was received
by Respondent on or about October 13, 2001.
31.

With regards to Interrogatory 2 and who was residing with Petitioner, Petitioner

answered that the parties' son, Jacob Black, was the only individual residing in Petitioner's residence.
32.

Notwithstanding whether Mr. Tomlin was actually residing with Petitioner at the time she

answered the above-referenced interrogatories, Petitioner was and is under a continual duty to
supplement her answers if circumstances change.
6

33.

Respondent alleges that Petitioner withheld information regarding her relationship and

living arrangement with Mr. Tomlin from Respondent and his counsel.
34.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(10) (as amended), Respondent alleges that

Petitioner cohabited with Mr. Tomlin for a significant period while Respondent continually paid spousal
support, therefore, Respondent's spousal support should cease and all previous spousal support
payments made by Respondent dating back to the filing of the original modification petition should be
reimbursed.

REQUEST FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER
35.

Respondent incorporates, by this reference, the allegations set forth in paragraphs 11

through 34 of this Petition.
36.

As alleged above, Petitioner has received spousal support from Respondent for a

significant length of time continuing beyond the length of the parties' marriage.
37.

However, as alleged above, Petitioner has cohabited with Mr. Tomlin in a

sexual/romantic/spousal relationship beginning sometime in approximately October 2000.
38.

The cohabitation ended after Petitioner's and Mr. Tomlin's relationship was discovered

by Respondent.
39.

While Petitioner and Mr. Tomlin appear to no longer be cohabiting, they continue to

develop the relationship and to, otherwise, act as husband and wife.
40.

As alleged above, Petitioner concealed her relationship with Mr. Tomlin from

Respondent, despite her continual duty to update Respondent's discovery request on the issue.
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41.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-4a-l (as amended), Respondent alleges that the facts as

presented herein show good cause as to why this Court should enter an order terminating spousal support
back to the date that Petitioner began cohabiting with Mr. Tomlin, in October 2000.
42.

Respondent alleges that Petitioner should be ordered to reimburse Respondent for all

spousal support amounts paid, dating back to the original date of her cohabitation with Mr. Tomlin, until
such time that this matter is adjudicated.
CONTEMPT
43.

Respondent incorporates, by this reference, the allegations set forth in paragraphs 35

through 42 of this Petition.
44.

On or about June 7, 2001, Respondent caused to be served the original modification

petition upon Petitioner through Summons and constable service.
45.

The constable stamp affixed/imprinted to the top of the returned Summons indicates that

Mr. Ted Tomlin accepted service at Petitioner's residence on June 7, 2001.
46.

As alleged above, Respondent propounded discovery through interrogatories to Petitioner

on or about August 13, 2001.
47.

Respondent specifically asked who was residing in her residence, and Petitioner did not

indicate that Teddy Tomlin was residing with her, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Tomlin accepted
service on the Summons that initiated this action. (Interrogatory #2.)
48.

As alleged above, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has been cohabiting with Mr. Ted

Tomlin in a sexual context since about October, 2000.
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49.

On or about May 24, 2005, Respondent deposed Petitioner, whereat Petitioner testified

that Mr. Tomlin had not resided/cohabited with her in a sexual context, but did admit, despite her answer
to Interrogatory #2, that Mr. Tomlin had spent nights at her residence and had slept in her bed with her.
50.

Respondent alleges that Petitioner has committed deceit or abuse of process outside of the

presence of the court or has otherwise unlawfully interfered with the process or proceedings of this court.
51.

Respondent alleges that Petitioner committed her contemptuous acts by not forthrightly

answering interrogatories as well as committing perjury through deposition testimony.
52.

Respondent alleges that Petitioner has committed other contemptuous acts in these

proceedings, to-wit: Petitioner contacted other deposition witnesses before the May 24, 2005 deposition
and asked them to lie or conceal the truth regarding her sexual cohabitation with Mr. Ted Tomlin.
53.

Respondent alleges that he has suffered an actual loss or injury due to Petitioner's

contemptuous acts.
54.

Respondent alleges that if Petitioner had forthrightly answered the interrogatories

propounded on August 13, 2001, that this matter would have been concluded in summary form and he
would not have continued to pay $750.00 per month in spousal support that was and is not due to
Petitioner.
55.

Respondent alleges that Petitioner should be found in contempt and that all available

damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-32-10 & 78-32-11 (as amended) should be awarded to
Respondent, including, but not limited to attorney's fees and costs.
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WHEREFORE, Respondent, Jon C. Black, respectfully prays thai the Court grant the following
relief:
1.

That all spousal support paid by Respondent to Petitioner be terminated.

2.

That Petitioner be ordered to reimburse Respondent for all spousal support amounts paid,

dating back to the original date of her cohabitation with Mr. Tomlin, and continuing until such time that
this matter is adjudicated.
3.

That Petitioner be found in contempt, and that the Court award Respondent all available

damages under the law for his loss or injuries suffered pursuant to Petitioner's contemptuous acts.
4.

That Petitioner pay Respondent's attorney fees and costs necessary to prosecute this

5.

That the Court award Respondent any further relief it deems just and equitable under the

matter.

circumstances.
DATED this ^

day of June, 2005.

BUCKLAND ORTON, LLC

Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify, that on this

Is '

day of June, 2005,1 delivered true and correct copy(s) of

the foregoing Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce to the following party(s):
Mr. Randy S. Ludlow
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

EjFirst Class U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
• F a c s i m i i e Transmission
r-, n
, „ ,.
U Personal Delivery
D E-mail Transmission Attachment

J
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Randy S.Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax:(801)328-0173

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIM S. BLACK,
Petitioner,

RESPONSE AND OBJECTION
TO MOTION TO AMEND
PETITION

vs.
JON CORNELL.BLACK,
Respondent.

Case No. 894900342 DA
Judge L A Dever
Comm. T. Patrick Casey

COMES NOW the petitioner, Kim S. Black, by and through her attorney of record, Randy
S. Ludlow, who hereby objects to the Motion to Amend Petition as made by the respondent.
1.

The respondent has requested relief of Court in order to file an amended petition

alleging a new cause of action. In reviewing this matter it is inappropriate to request that the
new cause of action be joined with the pending cause of action pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. In this matter, the presently pending Petition for Modification is based
upon a change in the statute which did not exist when the original Decree of Divorce was entered
BLACK, K - Response and Objection to
Motion to Amend Petition

in 1989. The original Decree of Divorce did not have a time limit nor any additional conditions
in regards to the requirements to pay alimony or when alimony would terminate. The statute
dealing with time limitation for the payment of alimony was enacted after the Decree of Divorce
was entered. The respondent, in his pending petition now seeks that the alimony terminate
based upon the statute that now limits alimony to a time period equal to the length of the
marriage. It has previously been determined by the Commissioner that a change in the statute
does not allow the Decree of Divorce to be modified pursuant to the request of the respondent
which is consistent with Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The trial, which is
presently scheduled for July 18, 2005, is based upon the relief requested pursuant to that
statutory change.
2.

The respondent now requests to terminate the alimony based upon an allegation

that there is cohabitation by the petitioner. The petitioner denies the claim that there is
cohabitation and her witnesses that she would call at time of trial would support her position.
This claim is a new claim and it is not related to the prior claim. The ultimate end, termination of
alimony, is consistent with each claim that is being made by respondent, but the request of the
relief is a new cause of action and should not be joined in the pending cause of action. Pursuant
to Trethewav v. Furstenau, 40 P.3d 649 (Ut. Ct. App. 2003), the Court looked at three (3) factors
and to determine whether or not the Court would allow a Complaint or other pleading to be
modified and joined in the presently pending cause of action. Those factors are: 1) timeliness of
the motion, 2) Justification for the delay, and 3) Prejudice to the other party . In this matter there
has not been timeliness of the motion. This action has been pending for in excess of four (4)
years and is set to go to trial. There can be no claim that the motion is timely and it should be

BLACK, K. - Response and Objection to
Motion to Amend Petition

2

denied on that factor alone The claim that there is justification for the delay as made by the
respondent is that the alleged cohabitation has been hidden from the respondent The petitioner
denies that she has been cohabitatmg now or has in the past so theie is not a piopei claim that
tiiue is justification for delay If the respondent believes that there is cohabitation then he had
the right to bring it at any time rather than waiting until just before the trial on the presently
pending matter Because of the presently pending tnal date it is inappiopriate to allow the
amendment to occur because the same would be prejudicial the petitionei Petitionei cannot
defend the new allegation at this time without the Court allowing a delay and theieafter
appiopnate discovery
3

Pursuant to Wells v Wells. 272 P 2d 167 (Utah 1954), the Utah Supieme Court

stated that the parties are usually granted leave to amend if the items are undei the same geneial
set of facts In this particular matter the pending petition is based upon a change in the statute
The pending request to modify deals with allegations of cohabitation

These aie diffeient fact

situations
4

In this matter, if the Court allows the petition to amended, theie would have to be

the necessary disclosures, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceduie, Attorney
Planning Meeting, and discovery completed by the petitioner, and other issues Petitioner
believes that it is more appropriate to require that the respondent file a new petition and if he
desires at that time to thereafter make a motion to join the two (2) petitions for judicial economy
for only one (1) trial rather then two (2) separate trials dealing with the attempt to terminate
alimony Given the present status of the case and the status of the law it is appropriate foi the
Court to deny the pending motion

BLACK K

Response and Objection to
Motion to Amend Petition

3

5.

The respondent has further requested authority from the Court to enter the others

nunc pro tunc. Such a request is inappropriate and is not authorized by statute. The only statute
authorizing nunc pro tunc, orders is pursuant to U.C.A. §30-4a-l, and it can only relate to the
marriage, the divorce, legal separation, or annulment of marriage. It does not give the Court
authority to enter orders relating to modifications of orders. It is further prohibited pursuant to
Case Law. See Crocket v. Crocket, 836 P.2d 818 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). Further, pursuant to
U.C.A. §78-45-9.3 (4) ( which statute used lo be U.C.A. §30-3-10.6), a child or spousal support
payment can only be modified effective from the date of service of the pleading. This statute is
codification of the case law that deals with support issues. The requested relief to have
respondents new cause of action be entered nunc pro tunc is prohibited and may not be sought
in this action.
DATED this

(_ day of July, 2005.

BLACK, K - Response and Objection to
Motion to Amend Petition

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this

day of July, 2005,1 caused to be mailed, by deposit in the

United States Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE AND
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO AMEND PETITION to the following:
Scott W. Hansen
BUCKLAND, ORTON, LLC
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 801
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Asa E. Kelly
KELLY & KELLY, LLC
859 East 900 South, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

^JJt^
Sharla J. Weaver
Legal Assistant

BLACK, K - Response and Objection to
Motion to Amend Petition
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EXHIBIT D

Randy S.Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax:(801)328-0173

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIM S. BLACK,

:

MOTION TO STRIKE

Petitioner,
vs.

:

JON CORNELL.BLACK,

:

Respondent.

:

Case No. 894900342 DA
Judge L A Dever
Comm. T. Patrick Casey

COMES NOW the petitioner, Kim S. Black, by and through her attorney of record, Randy
S. Ludlow, who hereby moves the Court for an Order striking paragraphs 35, through 55 of the
respondent's Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.
This Motion is based upon the fact that the requested relief to have it be nunc pro tunc is
inappropriate and is not allowable pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-9.3 and the case law in this area.
Further, the request for the contempt is also inappropriately presented and set forth in the
respondent's Amended Petition. Contempt is not appropriate when the petitioner has not violated

BLACK, K - Motion to Strike

any Court Order and as such it is inappropriately submitted to this Court.
DATED this _ [ _ day of August, 2005.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this

day of August, 2005,1 caused to be mailed, by deposit in the

United States Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
STRIKE to the following:
Scott W. Hansen
BUCKLAND, ORTON, LLC
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 801
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Asa E. Kelly
KELLY & KELLY, LLC
859 East 900 South, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

Sharla J. Weaver
Legal Assistant

BLACK, K - Motion to Strike
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EXHIBIT E

Third Judicial District

AUG 0 2 2005
By-

_

SALT LAKE C O U N T Y ^

Scott W. Hansen (1347)
BUCKLAND, ORTON, LLC
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 801
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)531-6686
Facsimile: (801)531-6690
Asa E. Kelley (7905)
KELLEY & KELLEY, LLC

859 East 900 South, Ste 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801)746-3315
Facsimile: (801) 359-3956
Attorneys for Respondent

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
KIM S. BLACK,
Petitioner,

)

ORDER RE: TELECONFERENCE
HEARING

]

v.

])

Case No.

894900342

JON C. BLACK,

))

Judge:

L. A. Dever

•

Commissioner:

T. Patrick Casey

Respondent.

This matter came on for a regularly scheduled telephone conference on July 11, 2005, at or about
the hour of 10:30 a.m., the Honorable L. A. Dever presiding. Present during the telephone conference,
were Randy S. Ludlow, attorney for Petitioner; and Asa E. Kelley, attorney for Respondent. The Court
heard argument by Mr. Kelley regarding Respondent's Motion to Amend Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce, and then heard argument by Mr. Ludlow regarding Petitioner's Response and Objection to
Motion to Amend Petition.

The Court, after hearing argument by counsel, reviewing all motions and responses/objections
properly before the Court, and being folly advised in the premises, hereby enters the following ORDER:
1.

Respondent's Motion to Amend Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce is hereby granted.

2.

Petitioner will have ninety (90) days from today's date (July 11, 2005) to conduct

discovery regarding the issues raised in Respondent's Amended Petition.
3.

Until trial in this matter is concluded or further Court order, Respondent shall deposit the

monthly spousal support payments directly into a trust account established with the Court.
4.

The Court strikes the bench trial set for July 18, 2005, without date.

DATED this

'

day of

U

W

U

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

ever
ourt Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify, that on this

•£?

day of

/ 7 ^ 9 **-S f~

, 2005,1 delivered

true and correct copy(s) of the foregoing Order Re: Teleconference Hearing to the following party(s):
Randy Ludlow
185 S. State St., Ste 208
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

&F^tXlass U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
S i m i l e Transmission
•-, _
, „ ..
U Personal Delivery
• E-mail Transmission Attachment

J
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EXHIBIT F

Third JudiCra* District

KCV 3 p 2007
r\K

£k

SALT. LAKE COIWTY
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIM S. BLACK,
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS and
ORDER

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 894900342
JON C. BLACK,
Judge L. A. Dever
Respondent.

This matter came on for trial on November 26 and 27, 2007. Petitioner was
present and represented by Randy S. Ludlow. The respondent was present and
represented by Asa E. Kelley and Scott W. Hansen.
After considering the testimony, exhibits and arguments the Court finds the
following:
FACTS
1. The parties were married June 7, 1980, and were divorced July 3, 1989.
2. The respondent, Jon Black, was 100% disabled at the time of the divorce.
3. The divorce was a default divorce.
4. The respondent was under a guardianship and conservator at the time of the

divorce.
5. The petitioner was the respondent's guardian and conservator at the time the
default against him was entered.
6. The petitioner was awarded alimony in the divorce decree in the amount of
$750.00 a month.
7. The petitioner, Kim Black, by her admission, met Mr. Ted Tomlin in the fall of
2000.
8. Ted Tomlin testified he met Kim Black in September of 2000 and asked her
son if she was single and would go to Wendover with him. The next day she went to
Wendover with Ted.
9. Ted's mother, Shirlene Tomlin, testified that Ted told her that he and Kim had
sex the first night they met. She also stated that Kim told her Ted lived in her house.
10. According to Jacob Black, Kim's son, Ted moved in with his mother soon
after the Wendover trip and remained there almost continuously until the depositions in
this case were noticed up. Jacob testified that Ted did go to Colorado to work on a
temporary basis but came back to Kim's house after a couple of months.
11. Jacob stated that after Ted moved in he slept in Kim's bed and that Kim was
there.
12. Jacob lived in the house until 2002. After that time he visited regularly and
2

there was no indications that the previous arrangements had changexJ.
13. Jacob testified that Ted him he was not getting enough oral sex and regular
sex with Kim.
14. Jacob stated that Kim and Ted acted as girl friend and boy friend. They
attended family functions as a couple. Ted bought Kim a promise or wedding ring.
They used terms of endearment and squabbled like a married couple. Exhibit 3a is a
family portrait of Ted, his step-daughters, grandchild, Kim and Jacob. Jacob stated his
fiance, Ashley, was not allowed in the picture because we were not married at the time.
15. Ashley Black is the niece of Ted Tomlin and the daughter-in-law of Kim
Black. She testified that Ted lived with Kim. She stated that there were three bedrooms
in Kim's house: Kim's, Jacob's and a basement bedroom that was used for storage.
She stated that she saw Ted in Kim's bed. She also stated that she saw Ted and Kim
in bed together and that often she would arrived at the house and Ted and Kim would
be in their pajamas. Ashley stated that Kim told her that after her hysterectomy she
didn't want to have sex anymore. The hysterectomy was after Ted moved in. Ashley
testified that she saw the ring Ted bought for Kim, it was a wedding style ring, gold with
diamonds.
16. Jacob and Ashley both testified that they were asked by Kim to move Ted's
personal belongings out of the house on a rush basis, just before the depositions in this
3

case were to be taken.
17. Ashley stated that Kim stated that she called Ted at work and told him not to
come home and left a note on his car saying he wasn't to come home. She also told
Ashley, numerous times, to say that Ted did not live at her house and not to talk to the
attorney about the matter.
18. Chrystal Nixon, Ted's step-daughter, stated that Kim and Ted appeared as a
couple, Kim would attend family functions and her daughter calls her "Grandma" and
she co-signed on a loan for her car.
19. Jackie Tomlin, Ted's ex-wife, testified that Kim and Ted appeared to be more
than just "buddies" and that Ted would introduce Kim as his girl friend.
20. Ted Tomlin testified that Kim co-signed for his car, that he bought her a ring
but it was only a joke. He also testified that Ex 3a was taken for his granddaughter's
birthday and that Ashley was not included because she was not yet married to Jacob.
21. Judy Ferguson, Ted's sister, testified that Ted was living at Kim's house, she
saw his clothes there, they attended family functions together, they acted as boy friend
and girl friend, they lived together. Ted told her that Kim did not want to have sex after
her operation. Judy told him she had the same problem and that Kim's desire would
come back. She stated that he moved out of the house because he was caught living
there. Judy also testified that she and her husband confronted Kim about living with
4

Ted and how it was wrong to take alimony since she was living with Ted.
22. Mark Fullerton, Ted's friend, first testified that Ted never stayed at Kim's, he
then stated that he was a trucker and was gone 2 out of 3 days and did not know what
Ted did when he was gone, then he testified that Ted slept at Kim's 50% of the time, at
least until April of 2004.
23. Kim Black and Ted Tomlin testified that they did not have sexual relations.
The Court finds that their testimony is not credible.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Cohabitation involves a two pronged analysis: common residency and sexual
contact evidencing conjugal association.
2. The evidence establishes that Kim Black and Ted Tomlin had a common
residency. At least from the fall of 2000 until the scheduling of the depositions, they
lived in the same house, shared a bedroom, shared food, participated in his family
functions, had photos taken as a family unit, portrayed themselves as boy friend and girl
friend and represented that fact to third parties. Ted Tomlin had access to the
residence when Kim was not present. The summons served on Ted Tomlin noted that
he was a resident of Kim's house. Kim supported Ted and co-signed on cars for him
and his daughter. Ted bought Kim a wedding or promise ring.
5

3. There was testimony that Kim and Ted had sexual relations the evening they
met and that Ted moved into the house soon after. There was testimony that Ted
stated he was not having oral and regular sex as often as he would like and inquired
from his sister how Kim's hysterectomy would effect her sexual desires.
4. These statements and inquiries establish that there was a sexual/conjugal
relationship between the parties. There is no requirement that the sexual relationship
be presently existing, only that it existed.
5. The respondent has met the burden to establish co-habitation and therefore
alimony is terminated.
6. The respondent originally filed to terminate alimony in June of 2001, on the
basis of a new statute. The respondent amended his petition to include co-habitation in
June of 2005.
7. The general rule is that the date of the modification of support or alimony is
tied to the date that the petition for modification is filed. The petition to modify was filed
in June of 2001. The petitioner was on notice that the request for termination was
before the Court. The fact that the grounds for termination was amended does not
effect that date. The effective date for termination is June of 2001 and not June of
2005, the date the petition was amended
8. Judgment is entered for the respondent for all alimony paid since June of
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2001, less the sums on deposit with the Court.
9. The sums on deposit with the Court are ordered released to the respondent,
Jon Black.
DATED this 30th day of November, 2007, and read in open Court.

BY THE COURT
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